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Q INCE every proceeding involves some aspect of procedure, the matter
of case selection for review necessarily reflects some choices by the
writer which others would omit, and vice versa. Because it would not be
feasible to present a discussion of all of the reported decisions, the treat-
ment here centers upon decisions which are thought to be of particular
interest. In addition to the case material, the new amendments to the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure are discussed.
I. SERVICE OF PROCESS AND JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
Until the advent of Texas rule 120a' a party who wished to question the
propriety of service of citation had, in essence, two choices: a motion to
quash which, even if sustained, constituted a general appearance and mere-
ly extended the time in which to answer,2 or a direct attack by motion for
new trial, appeal, or writ of error upon a default judgment which again,
even if successful, resulted in a general appearance for the new trial.3 The
defaulting party generally would not have a good excuse for purposes of
Bill of Review,4 and the judgment, if valid on its face, would not be sub-
ject to collateral attack in a Texas court.' Thus, where the party had a
good defense, it was more expeditious to answer and waive the defective
service.. Rule _120a, .authorizing-,a. special..appearance, broadens-the. choice.
by affording a suitable remedy for those parties who are not "amenable"
to process! Presumably because of the rule's express language, a party who
* B.S., Iowa State University; J.D, University of Iowa; LL.M., Yale University. Associate
Professor of Law,- Southern Methodist University.
Special Appearance. See 2 McDoNALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 9.05 (Supp. 1965).
'Id. at 770.
SAnglo Mexicana de Seguros, S.A. v. Elizondo, 405 S.W.2d 722, 725 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)
error ref. n.r.e. "The question relating to service of process will no longer be present in this case
because the defendant by prosecuting this writ of error proceeding has entered its appearance not
only in this Court but for future proceedings in the trial court as well." See also McKanna v.
Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1965).
4 Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 226 S.W.2d 996 (1950); 4 McDoNALD, TEXAS CIVIL
PRACTICE § 18.27 (1950).5 Martin v. Burns, 80 Tex. 676, 16 S.W. 1072 (1891); see Hodges,. Colateral Attacks on
Judgments, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 163 (1962). Compare O'Boyle v. Bevil, 259 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.
1958), holding in a collateral attack that the Texas presumption of absolute verity could not be
used to foreclose raising lack of due process under the fourteenth amendment.
' See Thode, In Personam jurisdiction; Article 2031B, the Texas "Long Arm" Jurisdiction
Statute; and the Appearance To Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEXAS L. REV.
279, 311-13 (1964).
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is "amenable" to service but is improperly served cannot avail himself of
the new provision.
In a court of civil appeals case' the nonresident defendant was served in
Arkansas under Texas rule 108. The court held that since the actioi-rrto re-
cover a monetary sum upon a contract of sale involving Texas real prop-
erty was in personam and not in rem,' it was subject to his plea to the
jurisdiction. The action was, therefore, dismissed. Although rule 108 pro-
vides fair notice and thus meets the requirement of procedural due pro-
cess, it is not a long-arm statute by which a state may acquire in personam
jurisdiction over nonresidents if there are certain "minimum contacts"
which supply the necessary substantive due process." Interestingly, the
plaintiff did not seek to invoke article 2031 (b) which might have resulted
in jurisdiction."'
Another intriguing problem to which rule 120a might be applicable is
that of service procured by fraud. In one case" a former husband, under
the guise of taking his former wife on a trip to Disneyland, decoyed her
into a trip to Texas wherein she was served. Although the general rule is
that service procured by fraud is invalid, there seems to be no Texas case
authority. 3 Unfortunately there is still none, because defendant-wife
failed to request any "findings of fact or conclusions of law" from the
trial court's overruling of her motion to quash.1' Consequently, the appeal
rested on the premise that all disputed facts must be resolved against the
existence of fraud.' Presently there is no reported holding on whether a
special appearance could be made to attack service procured by fraud.
Although rule 120a was promulgated because of problems arising under
article 2031 (b), until -its -application-is..judicially .revaled thre. isa,pref-,
7Henry v. Reno, 401 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
' If the proceeding had been in rem or quasi in rem, then there would be no question as to the
court's power over the controversy provided fair notice was given. Mulane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
'City of Houston v. Fore, 401 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error granted, which held
paving assessment lien void because notice by publication was not sufficient to comply with federal
constitutional due process requirements. See also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965), 19
Sw. L.J. 413 (holding divorced father who did not contribute to child's support and did not have
custody was entitled to reasonable notice of adoption proceeding).
"0See Trinity Steel Co. v. Modern Gas Sales & Serv. Co., 392 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App.
1965) error ref. n.r.e. See also discussion of Atwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson Farms, 357
F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1966) in text accompanying note 18 infra, and 2 McDoNALD, TEXAS CIvIL
PRACTICE S 9.29.1 (Supp. 1965).
"1 The opinion does not discuss sufficient facts to definitely determine it applicable. The plaintiff
apparently chose to rest jurisdiction on an in rem theory. See note 8 supra.
"Cornell v. Cornell, 402 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error granted.
3 See 2 McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE, S 9.12 (1950).
4 Cornell v. Cornell, 402 S.W.2d 71, 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error granted.
s""[W]e are required to test the validity of the court's action on the assumption that the trial
court found every disputed fact in such a way as to support the judgment. . . . And to indulge
every reasonable inference in favor of the judgments. . . . And to affirm if there is any evidence
of probative force to support the judgment upon any theory authorized by law." 402 S.W.2d at $73.
[ Vol. 21
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erable, in this writer's opinion, to the motion to quash.' Much still remains
to be decided in reference to rule 120a,"1 and the same may be said of
article 2031 (b). But one Fifth Circuit case" makes it clear that there are
no serious federal constitutional issues--even if broadly construed. 9 Judge
Brown, speaking for the court in Atwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson
Farms,m stated:
Article 2031b authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign cor-
poration where it is 'doing business' in Texas. And 'doing business' is de-
fined to include 'entering into contract by mail or otherwise with a
resident of Texas to be performed in whole or in part by either party in
this State. . . .' Since the exigencies of the case as a prelude to the discussion
of the Federal question require it, we now declare . . . that 'the Texas pur-
pose [in enacting article 2031b] was to exploit to the maximum the fullest
permissible reach under federal constitutional restraints.'
Now posed is the second question-whether the Texas statute as thus
applied offends the Federal Constitution. Constitutional restrictions on the
power of a state to acquire jurisdiction over a foreign corporation have been
the subject of several recent and far-reaching decisions of the Supreme Court.
The more restrictive notions of Pennoyer v. Neff, 1877, 95 U.S. 714, 24
L.Ed. 565, were discarded in International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington,
1945, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, and replaced by the
'minimum contacts' principle...
We . . . hold that a Court of Texas may, consistent with the Federal
Constitution and without offending 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice,' assert -jurisdiction over a foreign corporation under the
circumstances of this case."1
On the general question of the mechanics of service-of citation, a civil
- ppeals decision,- discussed--the essential-,elemen-ts of a-sherilf's, return and
10 Nothing is gained by a motion to quash except a delay of time in which to answer on the
merits. See note 2 supra.
" Subsections 2 and 3 of rule 120a imply that it could be proper for the court in entering
"an appropriated order" to include findings of facts and conclusions of law; indeed findings would
be required in federal court as to jurisdictional fact issues. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936). If a party has the right to such findings, does the failure to request
more result in all presumption being indulged in favor of this judgment? See Cornell v. Cornell,
402 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error granted, which applied those rules to a motion to
quash. There is still considerable dispute as to who has the burden of proof under rule 120a and
what facts must be proved. Compare Thode, note 6 supra, with Counts, More on Rule 120a, 28
TEXAS B.J. 95 (1965). See 2 McDoNALD, TEXAS CsVnL PPACTICE, § 9.05 (Supp. 1965). See also
Carpenter Body Works v. Mullay, 389 S.W.2d 331 (1965) error ref., holding rule 120a to be
interlocutory.
"
5 Atwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson Farms, 357 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1966). For further
discussion see Charmatz, Conflict of Laws, this Survey at footnote 5.
"Compare, however, the holding with New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567
(5th Cir. 1966), which held that first amendment considerations required more than a bare mini-
mum of contracts in order to justify the application of the Alabama long-arm statute. See dissenting
opinion by Judge Lynn, Id. at 580-82.
20357 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1966).
21 d. at 852, 8 54.
" T. P. Inv. Corp. v. Winter, 400 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error dismissed.
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reversed, in a direct attack, a default judgment obtained. The sheriff's
return on the citation recited that a copy of the citation along with the
petition had been delivered to the defendant..The blank form for,the re-
turn did not contain a place for describing the manner of service, and
none was inserted. This was held to violate rule 107 .e
Cases involving service of a counterclaim upon an incompetent plain-
tiff arose.
This answer by Roy Jones asserting a counter-claim was a cross-action
setting up an action different from that plead on behalf of the plaintiff
Elnora Bly by her next friend. Elnora Bly was as to this cross-action a de-
fendant. Rule 85. A plaintiff of unsound mind, represented at the time of
judgment in a suit by next friend as authorized by Rule 44, Vernon's Ann.
Tex. Rules, when cast into the position of a defendant by a cross-action
in the suit must be served with citation on the cross-action in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 106, else the judgment rendered it voidable
and may be set aside in a bill of review proceeding directly impeaching the
judgment..
In another decision involving service for a hearing on juvenile delin-
quency it was determined that:
In the absence of the voluntary appearances of the required parties, the
section requires the service of a summons on the person or persons having
the 'custody or control' of the child. In addition, where such person is not
the parent or guardian of the child, 'then the parent or guardian or both,
shall be notified of the pendency of the case . . . by personal service before
the hearing....' This provision for notice is vague and indefinite .
II. VENUE
The vast volume of venue appeals is attributable not only to a prefer-
ence for the location of trial but also to the tactical consideration of delay.
The latter situation is illustrated by the number of venue appeals which
involve well settled legal issues.
With reference to the pleading and procedural aspects of the plea of
privilege and controverting plea, the cases reflect no change in the judicial
z "Rule 107, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, requires the officer's return on the citation to
state 'the manner of service' . . . ." Id. at 958. Cf., Pipe Line Park Properties, Inc. v. Fraser, 398
S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) on service of writ of garnishment on corporate "vice presi-
dent" who was in fact secretary-treasurer not authorized to receive service under article 2.11:
Where, as in this case, the officer's return recites service of process on a corporation
by delivering it to a corporate officer designated by the statute, as distinguished
from those cases where the return shows delivery to one purporting to be an 'agent'
authorized to receive the same, the officer's return affords prima facie evidence that
the person served is such officer, obviating the necessity for the trial court to hear
evidence thereof.
Id. at 15 $.
24 Bly v. Harvey, 397 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e.
"
5Hawkins v. State, 401 S.W.2d 301, 302 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). See also Johnson v. State,
401 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (holding petition which did not allege which specific
penal ordinances had been violated insufficient to subject child to jurisdiction of juvenile court).
[Vol. 21
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adherence to strict compliance." Thus a plaintiff must file a controverting
affidavit to prevent transfer of venue as requested by defendant's plea of
privilege. To constitute waiver of the plea, it must appear that the defend-
ant sought a determination of its special exceptions to the petition prior
to the venue transfer." A court of civil appeals, in a suit upon a written
contract, applied the rule that when a venue fact is one which can be put
in issue only by a verified denial, the failure of the defendant to do so
obviates the plaintiff's necessity to prove the issue by independent evi-
dence."6 Likewise, the discovery rules may be sufficient to establish venue
facts. However, although the failure of one defendant to respond to a rule
169 request for admission that he was a resident of a certain county con-
stitutes an admission, it is not binding upon the co-defendant as to such
venue fact. 9
For venue purposes it is important to note the difference between the
existence of a cause of action and the existence of a defense which would
defeat a cause of action. The former, when a venue fact, must be estab-
lished,"6 while the latter, e.g., statute of limitations, is not relevant to the
venue hearing.2 ' Joinder of claims and joinder of parties continue to pro-
duce venue problems. Where there is a single defendant and related claims
are joined, if the plaintiff can maintain venue as to one claim then the en-
tire proceeding will be tried in that county,"' except when the other
claims concern mandatory venue provisions, such as Subdivision 14 ,' in-
volving suits for recovery of lands. Where there is joinder of parties sub-
divisions 4 and 29a must be considered. Subdivision 29a applies only when
venue as to one defendant is properly maintainable in the county under
one of the exceptions to the general venue rule contained in article 1995,
"See Leonard v. Maxwell, 365 S.W.2d 340 (1963); 1 McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE 5
4.43.1, 4.47, 4.49 (1965).
2 7 Geary, Hamilton, Brice & Lewis v. Coastal Transp., 399 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
26Burlbut v. Lyons, 405 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ .App. 1966) error dismissed. See also 1 Mc-
DONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE 5 4.43.1, at $79 (1965).
29 Davis v. Coastal States Petrochemical Co., 405 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
20 Pioneer Cas. Co. v. Miller, 399 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), holding under "no
action" clause in insurance policy which provided insurer would not be liable to injured party
until amount of insured's obligation to pay was determined by judgment or agreement, venue would
not be under 9(a), 23, 29a, against an insurance company who filed plea of privilege, since plain-
tiff had no cause of action against insurance company until the insured liability became fixed.
While the plaintiff must alwayt 'allege a cause of action, whether or not he must prove a cause
of action depends on the venue facts that must be established under the particular subdivision of
article 1995. involved.
a'Smiser v. Petroleum Ref. Co., 398 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965); 1 McDONALD,
TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 455, at 614 n.20 (1965). See note 5 supra.
"' Burke v. Scott, 400 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error dismissed, applying the Middle-
brook doctrine, which allows venue to lie in a county of proper venue as to one cause of action when
that cause of action is properly joined to another cause of action under which venue may be main-
tained in another county. The suit was on a promissory note joined with a suit on a contract out
of which the note arose. See Middlebrook v. David Bradley Mfg. Co., 86 Tex. 706, 26 S.W. 935
(1894).
a'See I McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 4.38 (1965).
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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
and the joined defendant is a necessary (not merely proper) party to such
claim?' Subdivision 4 applies when one of the defendants is a resident of
the county in which suit is brought." The confusion in the application of
subdivision 4 occurs because some courts require the joined non-resident
party to be a necessary party. To this writer, the test should be resolved
on the basis of whether the joined party is a proper party to the claim.
asserted against the resident defendant. If so, venue exists." When there is
a joinder of claims and a joinder of defendants so that the non-resident
defendant is a mere proper party to the lawsuit under the joinder rule
(e.g., plaintiff can join claim against resident defendant with a separate
claim against a non-resident if common questions of law and fact are
presented), but not a proper party to the cause of action or claim against
the resident defendant, subdivision 4 should not apply."' The ancillary
venue concepts existing where several claims are asserted against a single
defendant do not govern subdivision 4.'
Suits upon written contracts are maintainable under subdivision 5" in
the county of performance, providing that the contract unequivocably
designates a place within one county. The supreme court in Southwest
Inv. Co. v. Shipley emphasized the rule by its holding that a contract per-
formable in the city of Amarillo would not suffice because that city is
located in two counties.' Although subdivision 5 does not apply to oral
contracts or contracts that are part written and part oral,"' it will apply
to a subsequent written confirmation of a prior oral agreement. '
Other cases of interest under subdivision 5 held: that a foreclosure suit
on a mechanic's lien which arose out of a contract to be performed in a
particular county may be maintainedjin that county; _ that .suit onppte-
34 1d. at 5 4.36.
3
aId. at S 4.10.1.
"Compare Stull Chem. Co. v. Boggs Farmers Supply, Inc., 404 S.W.2d 78, 81 (Tex. Civ. App.
1966):
[T]o obtain the benefit of subdivision 4 of the venue statute he may do so by alleging
and proving a cause of action against the resident defendant and alleging a cause of
action against the nonresident defendant so intimately connected with the cause of
action alleged and proved against the resident defendant that the two may be joined
under the rule intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits. Proof of the nature of the
suit is shown by.plaintiffs' petition. Stockyards National Bank v. Maples, 127 Tex.
633, 95 S.W.2d 1300 (Com. App., opinion adopted by Sup. Ct.).
T See Rudine v. CMC Concrete Pipe Co., 404 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (holding
resident defendant must be more than auxiliary party and that a mere stakeholder is not sufficient)-.
s See note 32 supra.
"'TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (1965). See 1 McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE 55
4.11.1-11.5 (1965).
40400 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. 1966).
41 See I McDONALo, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE S 4.11.3 (1965).
4 Green-Gro Seed Co. v. Perry, 399 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). See also reference
cited note 41 supra.
"
3 Colonial Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Texboro Cabinet Corp., 401 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App.
1966). Note also that subdivision 12 may apply to a mechanic's lien foreclosure, placing venue in




against a partner and co-partner may be maintained in county of per-
formance as to the co-partner who did not sign note;" and that it is
sufficient to allege that a note was payable in the county and not necessary
to prove the validity of the cause of action as a venue fact."
Two cases under the negligence exception, subdivision 9a,' concerning
a continuing violation of a statute that occurred in the county of the ac-
cident and elsewhere, upheld venue" in county where the accident oc-
curred.
The policy in favor of the venue in suits involving title is reflected in
the mandatory provisions of subdivision 14. Being a mandatory subdivi-
sion either the plaintiff can maintain venue thereunder, or the defendant
can have the suit transferred to such county."5 Illustrative of the defend-
ant's right is a court of civil appeals decision" which held that the plain-
tiff must establish the inapplicability of the subdivision. When the plain-
tiff relies on subdivision 14, he need not prove as a venue fact that damage
to the land occurred but only that that suit is for damage to land."0 It is
the nature or the character of the suit and not whether the alleged cause of
action exists that is determinative." And in determining the nature of the
suit it is not merely the form of action or relief that controls if it appears
from the pleading that the real controlling issue is that of title.5"
Difficulties of venue under subdivision 23, governing corporations, are
all too familiar to those who have sought its utilization.' One civil appeals
decision"4 noted that when an offer is made by mail, telegraph or telephone
to a person in another county and accepted by him a contract is deemed
to have been made in the county where the offer is accepted and not in the
cQunty .where .the- offer, was made., Where a contract is breached by an
offeree in the county of the offeree's residence, venue will lie in that coun-
ty. A civil appeals case' dealt. with an agency- problem and concluded
"Gonzales v. Burns, 397 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error dismissed.
"Scott v. Beaver, 405 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
' TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (1955). See I McDONAL, TEXAS C;vL PRACTICE5 4.17.2 (1965).
'Mason Feed Store v. Starks, 398 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error dismissed, where
store violated article 911b which required a permit to carry goods on Texas highways by allowing
trucker with no permit to haul grain for them, this was negligent per se. The driver who had
no permit was an agent of the store which did have a permit to come under paragraph 2 of 9a.
Venue would lie in county of accident by virtue of 9a and case interpretation in Cardinal Petroleum
Co. v. Robinson, 394 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. Civ. App. 196Y), where violation of state statutes requiring
placement of reflectors to the rear and side of a stalled tractor-trailer was sufficient to maintain
venue in county where accident occurred.
4STEx. R. CIv. P. 86. See I McDoNALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE 5 4.22.1 (1965).
"Continental Oil Co. v. Anderson, 405 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error dismissed.
soCecil Ruby Co. v. Jones, 398 S.W.2d 337 (Tex, Civ. App. 1965) error dismissed.
s' Sammons v. Manning, 400 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error dismissed.
s Hawkins v. Gilger, 399 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error dismissed.
"3 See cases cited I McDoNALO, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 4.30.1 (1965).
"
4 National Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Center Plywood Co., 405 S.W.2d I15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)
error dismissed.
'Pepsi-Cola Co. v. Spangler, 401 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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that the terms "agent or representative" in subdivision 23 do not neces-
sarily include employees or servants. Whether a person is an "agent or
representative" is shown by proof of a situation in which the business of.
the company is actually conducted in the county of suit, or is shown by
proof that one who possesses broad powers from the defendant resides in
the county.
Il1. SPECIAL ISSUES
It is beyond the ambit of this paper to discuss the jurisprudential values
of the Texas special issue system or even to comment upon the motive of
various segments of the practicing bar in supporting or opposing the Texas
system.' Suffice it to say that the number of cases in which persons lost
or gained valuable rights, not because of the merits of their cause, but
because of the skill or lack thereof in the legal profession in relationship
to special issues suggests the need for finding means to improve the prac-
tice.'
Special issue practice requires the correlation of three matters: the
pleadings, the proof, and the issues to be submitted." Thus the careful
practitioner, prior to trial, will review the issues he plans to submit with
the evidence he plans to offer and with the existing pleading, which if
found lacking will be appropriately amended. For even if the evidence
comes in, the requested issue must be supported by a pleading." Likewise
where there is a failure of proof, there is no error in the refusal' to submit
special issues although the issue of failure usually prompts an appeal."
With reference to the proof problem it is essential to distinguish be-
tween legal insufficiency (no evidence of probative .force to. support the
special issue finding)"' and factual insufficiency (evidence is so weak, or
contrary to overwhelming weight of other evidence)." The supreme court
in Garza v. Alviar' discussed this problem and clarified an important rule,
'See, e.g., FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 181 (1936); Farley, Instructions to the
juries-Their Role in the Judicial Process, 42 YALE L.J. 194 (1932); Morgan, A Brief History
of Special Verdicts and Special Interrogatories, 32 YALE L.J. 575 (1923); Staton, The Special
Verdict as an Aid to the Jury, 13 AM. Jun. Soc. 176 (1930).
" For excellent articles see Stout, Our Special Issue System, 36 TEXAS L. REv. 44 (1957);
Green, Blindfolding the jury, 33 TEXAS L. REv. 273 (1956)4 Gay, "Blindfolling" the jury.
Another View, 34 TEXAS L. REV. 368 (1956); Green, A Rebsttal, 34 TEXAS L. REV. 382 (1956);
Gay, A Rejoinder, 34 TEXAS L. REv. 514 (1956).
" A good treatment of special issue practice is contained in HODGES, SPECIAL ISSUES IN TEXAS
(1959).
"Parker v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry., 401 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
6 Masso v. Stanbury, 399 S.W,2d 396 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.; Bourgue v.
Towers, 399 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref n.r.e. (no error to refuse submission of
discovered peril if evidence is uncontroverted); Frasier v. Pierce, 398 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e. (similarly, in absence of proof inferring defendant was aware of
plaintiff's perilous position).





viz: "A contention that an issue should not have been submitted, or that a
finding of the jury should be disregarded, because of the insufficiency of
the evidence is subject to only one construction. It can mean only that
there is no evidence to warrant submission of the issue or support the
jury's finding.""
In Garza the court of appeals had reversed because the evidence was
factually insufficient to support the findings. Although the supreme court
does not have jurisdiction to review whether the evidence was factually
insufficient, it does have jurisdiction to determine whether the point of
error of factual insufficiency was properly raised. The supreme court re-
versed on this latter ground holding that the plaintiff had by urging that
"there was insufficient support in the evidence to warrant the submission
of such issues to the jury""' raised a no evidence point and had not thereby
raised the factual insufficiency point. As a correlary rule, factual insuf-
fiency of the evidence is not a basis on which to object to submission of a
special issue: "The court may not, however, properly refuse to submit an
issue or disregard the jury's answer thereto merely because the evidence is
factually insufficient to support same.""0 The lesson of the Garza case that
the objection to submission raises only a no evidence point is a significant
one.
The importance of proper objections to special issues is again reflected
by two recent court of civil appeals opinions. In one the court held that
an objection to the court's charge for failure to submit a special issue,
which set forth an omitted issue but improperly placed the burden of
proof, does not constitute a request for a submission as required by rule
th279e In- e'other-casel" aiiemp-lye edid-not oblject f6" he-si bmission"of
special issues that were conditioned upon an affirmative response to an un-
necessary (undisputed) issue."' When the jury answered the undisputed
issue in the negative, the trial court applied the omitted issue rule to the
conditioned and thus unanswered, issue and ruled against the employee."0
A continuing problem in the form of special issues concerns the use of
evidentiary terms and the use of a global inquiry. In a civil appeals case"
4 Id. at 824.
83 Ibid.00 Ibid.
"
7 Schad v. Williams, 398 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
"Bell v. Aetna Cas. & Sur, Co., 394 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e.
69d. at 833. "Special Issue No. I should not have been submitted. Appellant did not object.
70Id. at 833.
Having thus acquiesced in the manner of submission, and since the condition on
which such issues were to be answered did not come to pass, appellant must be held
to have waived his right to jury findings on such issues. The court, therefore, was
authorized to make and file written findings on such unanswered issues in support of
its judgment. In the absence of written findings the omitted issue or issues are deemed
as found by the court in' such manner as to support the court's judgment.
71 Industrial Oxygen Co. v. Campbell, 405 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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the issue was whether a truck's rear reflectors "had mud or dirty water...
so that the reflectors were not visible."" In approving the issue the court
correctly observed that the inclusion of evidertiary. facts does not make
the issue multifarious or duplicatous where it involves only one ultimate
issue." The inherent problem of including evidentiary facts is the inherent
danger of having the issue constitute a comment on the evidence.'
The problem of a global or overly broad and general special issue was
authoritatively discussed by the supreme court in Barclay v. C. C. Pitts
Sand &q Gravel Co." There the court struck down the use of the term
"proper control" but did note that there are other "more or less general
inquiries" which may be submitted, including proper lookout, attractive
nuisance, and discovered peril."0 In one decision," a court of civil appeals
had occasion to apply Barclay to a situation involving an intersection col-
lision in which the jury had found against specific inquiries of contribu-
tory negligence, but in favor of a general issue of contributory negli-
gence.7 ' The court, while critical of broad issues ("improper") held that
where a party submits specific issues he waives the right to have a general
inquiry.7' Consequently, such a general finding does not create a conflict
and may be disregarded. "
An interesting application of the conflicting special issue rule occurred
in an automobile collision suit in which the defendant cross acted. 1 The
jury found that the defendant failed to keep a proper lookout and that
the plaintiff failed to keep a proper lookout. In addition, there were spe-
cific findings that the plaintiff was negligent in driving from the inside
lane to the outside lane and failing to give proper signals. The court held
that there was a conflict between the finding of the defendant's improper
lookout and the specific findings of the plaintiff's negligence. To determine
751d. at 795.
'3 Id. at 796. See also Masterson, Preparation and Submission of Special Issues in Texas, 6 Sw.
L.J. 163 (1952).
"
4 HODGES, SPECIAL ISSUES IN TEXAS 19-24 (1959).
75 387 S.W.2d 644 (TeL 1965).
76 Id. at 648.
77Smith v. Chase, 405 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.'.e.
7Sld. at 451-42.79 Id. at 453.
It is significant that in the case under consideration specific acts which went to make
up the question of 'traffic conditions then existing' were submitted to the jury and,
incidentally, found in favor of appellants. The question of the court to the jury
inquiring whether Mrs. Smith was negligent in crossing the street at the time and on
the occasion in question and under the circumstances then existing was undoubtedly
a broad and global submission which permitted the jury to take into consideration
any fact or circumstance which they might consider to be pertinent or material to
the issue. Such question encompasses the elements of speed, brakes, lookout and other
specific matters which go to constitute the 'condition then existing.'
As stated by Justice Norvell in Barclay, a litigant should be allowed to go either global or
specific, but he cannot go both ways.
"Id. at 455 (dissenting opinion).
a' Brooks v. Moreland, 404 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
.[Vol. 21
1967] TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE 165
the existence of the conflict the court looked to the specific evidentiary fac-
tors which could go to make up the general issue of proper lookout and
concluded that.the specific- jury findings against the plaintiff negated the
existence of such grounds against the defendant. Since all of the conflict-
ing issues were supported by some evidence the cause was reversed and
remanded for a new trial."
On the interrelated problem of conflicting special issues and material
issues the supreme court in C & R Transp., Inc. v. Campbell" reiterated
the basic principles and held that the negative answer to a special issue
which placed the burden of proof in the affirmative could not be used as
a finding in determining the existence of conflicts. The court then held
that the evidence was legally sufficient to support a proper. lookout issue.
The four-judge dissent viewed the proper lookout issue as immaterial be-
cause there should be no duty of the lead driver to keep such a lookout
under the circumstances. The court's division points up the substantial
problem that exists in analysing facts to determine the existence of a legal
duty. Not only is duty a substantial problem, but it is one whose signifi-
cance is often overlooked.
A case of tactical interest upheld the trial court's discretion as to the
order of the charge, in which the damage issue had been placed after the
plaintiff's issues and before the defensive issues."
IV. MOTION FOR NEW TRIALS,
Nunc Pro Tuncs AND APPEALS
Among the contributions that the State Bar of Texas has provided its
iemfibeis is the recentv ,-Afli,)ppellate Procedure in Texas."5 The thousands
of cases that are digested under the Appeal and Error heading underscore
the continual problem which emerges in this area, and perhaps surprisingly,
the number of well-settled points that appear to be urged. The foregoing
phrase, "appear to be urged," is used advisedly because in most instances
it is not the existence of the principal that is challenged but whether it is
applicable to the peculiar facts at hand.
Texas appellate practice requires careful attention to the proper preser-
vation of error in the trial court and careful consideration of the dangers
of waiver. Thus even though a motion for new trial is not a prerequisite
to appeal in a non-jury case, when such motion is filed it will govern the
appeal times, and errors not assigned in the motion will be waived on
appeal."
"Id. at 9S1. On conflicts, see also Brown v. Dale, 395 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)
error ref. n.r.e.
83406 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. 1966).
84 Ft. Worth Nat'l Bank v. Jones, 403 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
"STATE BAR OF TEXAS, APPELLATE PROCEDURE SN TEXAS (1964).
"Craig v. Stephenville State Bank, 395 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error dismjssed.
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With reference to the time limit for appeal, a court of appeals decision
discusses the effect of a nunc Pro tunc order (see rules 306a, 306b, and
316) of the trial court entered more than thirty, days after the entry 9f
judgment."' It is well established that the trial court loses all jurisdiction
after thirty days and that an order entered after that date to set aside a
voidable order is itself a wholly void order." On the other hand rule 316
does not specify any time limits for making a nunc pro tunc order and
rule 306b clearly states that the time for appeal commences to run from
the entry of the nunc pro tunc order. Robertson v. Blackwell Zinc Co."
held that an order to correct the record to show that the motion for new
trial was overruled on November 25 instead of November 23, 1963, could
be made more than thirty days after the entry of the judgment and that
the time from appeal would commence to run from the entry of the
nunc pro tunc order." The supreme court in an n.r.e. opinion as to the
right of an individual not named as a party, but considered as a party
under the doctrine of virtual representation, to obtain review in a court
of civil appeals by writ of error went on to expressly disclaim "approving
or disapproving" the other holdings "of the Austin Court."" The trial
court in the present case entered a second judgment setting aside the first
judgment; the second judgment copied the first judgment verbatim with
the addition that the defendant gave notice of appeal in open court. The
court of civil appeals held that the second judgment did not constitute a
nunc pro tunc order under rules 316 or 306a and thus avoided the issue
left open by the supreme court in Robertson.
To this writer, it would not seem desirable to permit nunc pro tunc
orders to undermine the finality of judgments. But until-the -supreme
court clarifies the limits of nunc pro tunc appeals?" or the rule is amended,
the lawyer who has discovered that appeal time has slipped by is well
advised to consider an appeal via a nunc pro tunc order.
In appeals from nonjury cases not involving fundamental error, the
failure to obtain findings of fact and conclusions of law is apt to prove
fatal."2 In a court of appeals decision it was held that a request for find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law filed with the clerk-two days prior to
judgment were timely and where the trial judge three days after judgment
s
7 Stonedale v. Stoncdale, 401 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
"McEwen v. Harrison, 162 Tex. 125, 345 S.W.2d 706 (1961).
"390 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. 1965).
"Ambassador Oil Corp. v. Robertson, 384 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) error rel. n.r.e.
9 See note 89 supra.
" It would be possible to confine the appeal to the matter corrected by the nunc pro tunc
order, but this is not the present practice as illustrated by Robertson; see text accompanying note
89 supra. The express dicta of the supreme court is certainly a clear indication that the practice of
nunc pro tune appeals is an open question.
"aPan Am. Sign Co. v. J. B. Hotel Co., 403 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
"Fortney v. Olivetti Underwood Corp., 398 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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denied request, as untimely. It excused the requirement of rule 297 that
failure of the court to file findings must be brought to the attention of the
judge.
V. AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
Pursuant to the supreme court's rulemaking power, some fifteen
changes in the rules were promulgated. They became effective on January
1, 1967." The changes range from technical amendments to major mod-
ifications. Until the advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1938, procedural reform in the United States in general proceeded at a gla-
cier-like pace." It is indeed a healthy sign that the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure are not frozen.
The new rules adopted concern the following:
New Rules. Rule 14b provides for the return or other disposition of ex-
hibits after judgment has become final and the times for various reviews
have expired;
Rule 75a provides that the court reporter shall file with the clerk all
exhibits which were proffered on a bill of exception during any hearing,
proceeding, or trial;
Rule 75b provides for the conditions by which exhibits other than those
disposed of by rule 14 may be withdrawn from the clerk;
Rule 226a provides for admonitory instructions to the jury panel as
prescribed by the supreme court."
Rule 239a provides for post card notice of a default judgment to be
hraied -by cl-k to defaulting -party's last'known addies as supplied by a
certificate of the prevailing party. Of the new rules, 239a is the most sig-
nificant and represents a change of attitude towards the time-honored
practice of taking a default judgment and then "hiding behind the log"
until the time for a new trial and appeal had expired," thus forcing a sol-
vent defendant to attack the judgment by writ of error (providing the
record was defective) ," or by bill of review (providing a good excuse and
defense existed) ;10
Amendmients. Rule 74 was amended to permit filings of exhibits with
the judge who shall note the time and date and transmit them to the clerk;
"'Texas Supreme Court, Civil Procedure Rules Amended, 29 TEXAS B.J. 735 (1966).
"I McDoNALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE S .02 (1965); 1B MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.501-0.512 (1965).
"7 The court simultaneously promulgated detailed jury instructions. Texas Supreme Court, Civil
Procedure Rules Amended, 29 TEXAS B.J. 735, 782 (1966).
"'See, e.g., McEwen v. Harrison, 162 Tex. 125; 345 S.W.2d 706 (1961).




Rule 166a was amended to ban any oral testimony on hearing for sum-
mary judgment.'
Rule 168 was amended to permit filing with the clerk copies ,of.inter-
rogatories when there are more than four parties, and was amended to
make the sanctions under rule 215 (a) and (b) applicable where the party
refuses to answer certain interrogatories, and the sections Under rule
215 (c) applicable when the party fails to serve his answers;
Rule 186b was amended to provide that notice to take depositions and
interrogatories other than under rule 187 may not be given prior to ap-
pearance day without leave of court, which leave may be with or without
notice;
Rule 265 was amended to permit each party to either read his pleading
or state the nature of his case to the jury, but not both;
Rule 309 was amended to provide that an order of sale in foreclosure
proceedings is directed to any sheriff or any constable within the state;
Rule 329b was amended to give a party the right to amend a timely mo-
tion "without" leave of court;
Rule 372 was amended to permit anything occurring in open court or in
chambers to be included in the statement of facts when so certified by the
court reporter and to provide for the allocation of costs of voir dire and
jury argument;
Rule 483 was amended to provide means of dismissing moot matter
contained in an application for writ of error to the supreme court with-
out the necessity of granting the writ; and
Rule 571 was amended to require the filing of an appeal bond by a
plaintiff whose claim was denied in whole or'in part.''
Repealed. Rule 188, which formerly governed depositions (interroga-
tories) of adverse parties was repealed. Such rule in effect became obsolete
upon the adoption of rule 168 in 1962.0'
Of the amendments, the most significant conecrn the discovery sanc-
tions under rule 168 and the repeal of rule 188. Interrogatories under
rule 168 are ex parte 0' and provide, unlike interrogatories under rule
186a 03 and former rule 188,'" that the answers "may be used only against
the party answering the interrogatories." ' Considerable advantage is also
gained in using rule 168 in discovery against corporate parties because the
answers must be in conformity to information known or available to the
"' Texas Supreme Court, Civil Procedure Rules Amended, 25 TEXAS B.J. 371 (1962).
.20 TEx. R. CIV. P. 168. See McGlinchey, Sanctions Available to Parties in Texas Discovery
Procedures, 19 Sw. L.J. 740 (1965).
1 3 Weinstein, Blert, & Kay, Procedures For Obtaining Information Before Trial, 35 TEXAS L.
REV. 481 (1957).
14Ibid. Masterson, Adversary Depositions and Admissions Under Texas Practice, 10 Sw. L.J.
107 (1956).
103 TEx. R. CiV. P. 168.
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corporation and not matters merely within the personal knowledge of a
particular officer or agent.'"
Because of the confusion of terms in Texas, discovery rules resulted
from an ad hoc conglomeration 6f federal discovery rules with Texas
discovery principles, and it was not clear what sanctions, if any, were ap-
plicable when the party did' not comply with requests for interrogatories
under rule 168."0 Whatever the merits, or lack of merits of such argu-
ments, the rule today is undeniably clear in providing for the application
of the sanctions under rule 215 (a), (b) and (c). The most serious sanc-
tions, including default, are governed by rule 215 (c) which would apply
where the party fails to serve his answers to interrogatories.'" The failure
to serve answers, however, should be distinguished from the refusal to an-
swer interrogatories. For if a party should refuse to answer all of the in-
terrogatories but serves this answer even if all of the interrogatories were
proper and should have been answered, the sanctions available are those of
rule 215(a) and (b), but not (c).'
In Ex Paret Hanlon,' the supreme court held in granting habeas corpus
that an insurance investor may refuse on deposition to preserve testimony
to give the name of a potential defendant to an automobile suit who was
unknown to the plaintiff. It is submitted that the identity of a party is a
legitimate subject of rule 186a and that the rule needs amendment to
avoid such overrestrictive interpretations as the above.
VI. POTPOURRI OF PROCEDURE
In the footnote that concludes this section a number of decisions are set
forth to permit the- reader a kaleidoscopic -review of 1966;-Prior to this-
review, though, one case, or series of cases, reflecting the Keystone Cop
juridical relationship between the Texas Supreme Court and the United
'" See discussion of federal rule 33 from which 168 was adopted, MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
5 33.07 (2d ed. 1966).
1"' For example, does the term deposition for purposes of imposing sanctions include both oral
examination by the attorney and written interrogatories by court reporter as well as ex parte inter-
rogatories; does interrogatory include all types of interrogatories under all the discovery rules? See
McGlinchey, supra note 102.
'08 Tex. R. Civ. P. 168.
If a party, except for good cause shown, fails to serve answers to interrogatories after
proper service of such interrogatories, the court in which the action is pending may,
on motion and notice, make such orders as are just, including those authorized by
paragraph (c) of Rule 215a.
109 Tex. R. Civ. P. 168.
If a party refuses to answer any interrogatory, the proponent of the question may,
upon reasonable notice to all persons affected, apply to the court in which the action
is pending for an order compelling an answer. Reasonable expenses, including reason-
able attorney's fees, incurred in obtaining the order or opposing the motion may be
assessed, and a refusal to comply with the order shall authorize the court to act, as
provided in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 215a.
"50406 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. 1966).
1967]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit should not go unnoticed-
the Delaney series of cases111 involving the merits of whether a pilot of a
plane was a passenger within the meaning of an insurance contract. The
Fifth Circuit, upon the occasion of having two different panels reach
different results, decided in an en banc hearing to abstain."1' It may be fair-
ly argued that it was improper to invoke abstention."1 The Texas Supreme
Court apparently did not relish the thought of being a briefing clerk for
the Fifth Circuit and apparently is not jealous about the concurrent as-
pects of diversity jurisdiction. It held the declaratory judgment proceed-
ing to be a request for an advisory opinion and thus not within Texas'
jurisdiction,'1 4 although it may be fairly argued that the decision would
not have been advisory."' The Fifth Circuit then held on the merits that
the pilot of the plane was not a passenger."' It may be fairly argued that
the Texas Supreme Court has held the opposite in an analogous case.'
Somewhere, somehow, as far as the parties are concerned, the concept that
justice delayed is justice denied got lost.
The potpourri now follows in the footnotes.1
".. United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 308 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1962), rehearing en banc,
328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964); United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v.
Delaney, 396 S.W.2d (Tex. 1965); United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 358 F.2d 714 (5th
Cir. 1966), 20 Sw. L.J. 402. For further discussion see Charmatz, Conflict of Laws, this Survey at
footnote 70. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 359 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1966). The
Paul Revere action was considered in the United Servs. rehearing but was not considered in thbe
denial of certiorari.
"' United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935
(1964).
"a Note, Refusal of State Court To Assume jurisdiction After Federal Abstention, 20 Sw.
L.J, 402 (1966).
"4396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1965). "
11 Note, Refusal of State Court To Assume jurisdiction After Federal Abstention, 20 Sw.
L.J. 402 (1966); Note, Courts-Advisory Opinions, 44 TEXAs L. REv. 1394 (1966).
"' United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 358 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1966).
"' See, Note, Construction of Texas Insurance Contract-Erie Misapplied, 20 Sw. L.J. 878
(1966).
"'Actions: Missouri Pac. Truck Lines v. Brown Express, Inc., 399 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e. (declaratory judgment); McGrath v. San Antonio & Farmers Dairies,
398 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref.' n.r.e. (suit on judgment); Price v. St. Paul
Mercury Ins., 397 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (declaratory judgment); Blackstock v.
Tatum, 396 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (abuse of process); Kelsey v. Corbett, 396 S.W.2d
440 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e. (quo warranto); Gage v. Owen, 396 S.W.2d 189 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1965) (trespass to try title).
Bill of Review:
Corporate stockholders. Farris v. Nortex Oil & Gas Corp., 404 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. Civ. App.
1966) error ref. n.r.e. (bill of review is only remedy available to stockholders of a dissolved cor-
porate defendant to set aside judgment against corporation since stockholders were not parties and
could not appeal in that case).
Court official's mistake. Vogel v. Vogel, 405 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (when all
of the elements of a bill of review are present, a complainant is entitled to relief where error of a
court official has prevented complainant from presenting defense); Browne v. General Elec. Co.,
402 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error dismissed (when defendant's counsel asked clerk as
to time of trial and clerk misinformed him, proper to set aside default judgment when defendant
has met other elements for bill of review).
Continuance: National Ins. Co. of America v. Broome, 401 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)
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error ref. n.r.e. (witness in jail as grounds); Bray v. Miller, 397 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. Civ. App.
1965) error ref. n.r.e. (in discretion of court); Stefanov v. Ceips, 395 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1965) (after withdrawal of attorney).
Discovery: Davis v. Coastal States Petrochemical Co., 405 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)
(discovery in venue questions);- Lawrence v. Farm.& Home Say. Ass'n, 401 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1966) (oral deposition available to corporate defendant); Miller v. Esunas, 401 S.W.2d
150 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e. (discovery to determine fraud); Texhoma Stores v.
American Cent. Ins., 398 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App.) error ref. n.r.e. per curiam, 401 S.W.2d
593 (Tex. 1966) (discovery and use of tax returns).
judgments:
Appeal. Atomic Fuel Extraction Corp. v. Slick, 403 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1966) (refusal of
writ of error with notation of "no reversible error" is not approval of all of civil appeals opinion);
Jones v. El Chorro Drilling Co., 405 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (court of civil appeals
may but does not have to dismiss appeal when appellant does not file brief within prescribed time);
Offer v. Bell, 397 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (for judgment to be final and appealable, it
must determine whole case, dispose of all matters involved in suit, and determine rights of all
parties, otherwise it is interlocutory and non-appealable, unless the trial court has ordered severance).
Collateral Attack. Vance v. State Bd. of Hairdressers & Cosmotologists, 400 S.W.2d 954
(Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. (criminal conviction); Cooper v. Texas Dept. of Pub. Safety,
398 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e. (traffic conviction); Callaway v. Elliott,
396 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error dismissed (divorce decree); Whitaker Oil Co. v.
Ward, 396 S.W.2d 158, motion to certify overruled, 398 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)
(order appointing a receiver).
Equity. Johnson v. Avery, 400 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error granted; Brownlee
v. Kirkwood, 396 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (injunctions); Rogers v. Carvain, 396
S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (specific performance); Noel v. Huvard, 395 S.W.2d 953
(Tex. Civ. App. 1965); Chemical Cleaning & Equip. Co. v. Winn, 395 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1965) (temporary injunctions); Cone v. City of Lubbock, 395 S.W,2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App.
1965) error ref. n.r.e.
Judgment NOV. Boswell v. Handley, 397 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. 1965) (summary judgment
improper since rule 166-A was not complied with in absence of certified or verified copy of a will
and order probating it); Hill v. W. E. Brittarm, Inc., 405 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)
(notice of hearing); Ackerman v. Vordenbaum, 403 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (general-
ly, an oisder overruling motion for summary judgment is interlocutory in nature and not appeal-
able); Hays v. Norton, 400 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (requisites); Prince v. Peurifoy,
396 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (judgment solely on a cross-action without disposing of
plaintiff's cause of action is not a final judgment. The same is true when a judgment is rendered
on plaintiff's cause of action without disposing of a cross-action); Stansbury v. Hicks, 396 S.W.2d
526 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (subject matter of cause in which- judgment has become final can only.
be reached by an equitable proceeding, and judgment therein cannot be revised unless and until
all parties interested in subject matter of suit are made parties to independent equitable proceedings
attacking judgment); Perkins v. Hale, 396 S.W.2d .149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error Y'ef. n.r.e.
(disregarding jury findings); Robertson v. Rig-A-Lite, 394 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)
(requisites).
Jurisdiction. Rosenfeld v. Steelman, 405 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. 1966) (inasmuch as the record
did not show that the owner was an indispensable party who had an interest in the action which
would prevent the trial court from fully adjudicating the rights of those who were parties to the
action, it was improper to consider the owner's affidavit filed in the court of civil appeals after the
trial court record had been filed, to determine trial court's jurisdiction).
Res Judicata. Ladd v. Ladd, 402 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e. (divorce
-- community property); Marange v. Marshall, 402 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref.
n.r.e. (suit against employer barred action against employee).
Summary Judgment. (Note rule change); Boswell v. Handley, 397 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. 1965)
(strict compliance with rule 166-A); Dunlap v. Executive Inn Motor Corp., 404 S.W.2d 842 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e. (issue of contributory negligence may prevent judgment); Richard
v. Allen, 402 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (taking of testimony controlled by rule 166-A);
Glenn v. Nelis, 400 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (may not be granted in absence of plead-
ings); Foster v. Texas Dept. of Pub. Safety, 398 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (supported
by extrinsic evidence); Sawyer v. Getz, 398 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e.
(good general discussion); Cotton v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 395 S.W.2d (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)
error ref. n.r.e. (unsure pleading not evidence).
Jury: State v. Hilton, 405 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (selection of juror); Warren
v. Dikes, 404 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (jury misconduct); Missouri Pac. R.R. v.
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Kennedy, 403 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e. (jury misconduct); London v.
Bergeron, 398 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e. (polling jury); Flowers v.
Flowers, 397 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App. 196S) (jury selection).
Limitations: Dunn v. Reliance Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 405 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)
error ref. n.r.e. (conditional cause of action--condition must occur); Thomas v. Cactus Drilling
Co., 405 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (misnomer or mistake of party); Knox v. Donovan
Lowery Ins. Agency, 405 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (subsequent intention to prosecute
claim controls, not mere filing of suit); Olson v. Passero, 402 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)
error ref. n.r.e. (limitations run from time of alleged negligent acts not from time of discovery of
acts); State v. El Paso Elec., 402 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e. (successor
claimant barred when original claimant barred); McFadden v. Haggard, 398 S.W.2d 638 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1966) (acknowledgment of debt as removing bar of limitations).
Mandamus: Dykes v. City of Houston, 405 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1966) (trial court may issue
mandamus to impel the performance of an act involving an exercise of discretion or judgment in
a proper case where clear abuse of discretion and no adequate remedy at law); Trantham v.
Slaughter, 405 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (judicial and discretionary actions); Fenner
v. Brockmoller, 404 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (purpose, application and effect); State
v. Standard, 401 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error granted (res judicata); Tobbs v. Coker,
401 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (mandamus to require judge to set aside denial of applica-
tion to appeal); Long v. Compton, 398 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (mandamus directing
clerk to transfer cause); Kothmann v. Daniels, 397 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (juris-
diction).
Motion for New Trial:
Amended motion. Miller v. Esunas, 401 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
(Texas Rule 329b(2) provides mandatory time limit of 20 days, after filing original motion for
new trial, for filing any amended motion. If transcript failed to disclose when original motion was
filed, court of appeals could not determine if amended motion was timely, thus appeal had to be
dismissed.)
Court's discretion. Tarver v. Ed. C. Smith & Bros., 402 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)
(granting or denying motion for new trial in court's discretion and will not be reversed except
for manifest abuse of discretion).
Grounds. Vela v. Sharp, 395 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e. (Motion
for new trial on default judgment should be granted when movant shows himself and clients free
from negligence at not being present at trial and that a meritorious defense exists. Opposing parties'
counter affidavits and testimony is not to be taken into consideration of motion for new trial in
default judgment.).
Inadequate representation by counsel. Sandoval v. Rattikin, 395 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App.1965) error. ref..-n.r.e.- .(no. abuse if discretio,..shown.-by...over org n otionfos new. trial when
grounds that movant had meritorious defense but was prevented from proving defense by inadequate
counsel by legal aid service).
New evidence. Terbay v. Pat Canion Excavating Co., 396 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Civ. App.
1965) error ref. n.r.e. (motion for new trial should be granted on grounds of newly discovered
evidence if movant had exercised "ordinary diligence" in investigating auto accident, and newly
discovered evidence would change outcome of trial).
Overruled by operation of law. Washington v. Golden State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 405 S.W.2d
856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (motion for new trial overruled by operation of law if not acted upon
within 45 days after original motion failed-Texas Rule 329b).
Time limits. Hilatex, Inc. v. State, 401 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
(very interesting case on trial court jurisdiction to enter order denying or granting motion for
new trial and jurisdiction to overrule previously grinted or denied motions according to rule 329b) ;
Nickd v. Anderson, 399 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (when motion for new trial is filed
in non-jury case, time limit for appeal begins to run after motion for new trial is overruled, by
law or by the court).
Parties: Newsom v. Newsom, 403 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. 1966) (supreme court's refusal of writ
of error should not be taken as approval of the court of civil appeals' holding that surety on bond
was a necessary party to appeal from probate court).
Pleadings: Smith v. City of Dallas, 404 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (plea in bar);
Friedman v. Cohen, 404 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (special exceptions); Thornhill v.
Elskes, 403 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (amended pleadings); Pfeiffer v. Bissett, 402
S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (answer as appearance).
